I hope this article will prove an eye opener for some Baloch extremists who want to gain independence from Pakistan. India is not only exploiting Bangladesh after separation from Pakistan, but is also killing hundreds of Bengalese on the western border, using its border security force. And they hang their corpses so that other Bengalese can learn a lesson.
Would our Baloch brothers learn a lesson?
*Role of RAW in Liberation of Bangladesh*
By B Raman
Covert action capability is an indispensable tool for any State having
external adversaries. Its purpose is not just collection of intelligence,
but the protection of national interests and the safeguarding of national
security through deniable actions of a political, economic, para-diplomatic
or para-military nature. A State resorts to covert action if it finds that
its national interests cannot be protected or its national security cannot
be safeguarded through conventional political, economic, diplomatic or
military means or if it concludes that such conventional means are not
feasible.
Any intelligence agency worth its salt will have a covert action capability
ready for use, when necessary. The Governments of some countries openly
admit the availability of such a capability in their intelligence agencies,
but not the details of their operations, which have to be secret and
deniable. Others don't admit even its existence.
In India too, the IB, under the foresighted leadership of the late
B.N.Mullik, its second Director, had a limited covert action capability for
possible use. The covert action division of the IB played a notable role in
the then East Pakistan to counter the activities of the ISI in India's
North-East.
The R&AW had inherited from the IB its intelligence collection and covert
action capabilities relating to Pakistan and China. These were not up to
the standards of the intelligence agencies of the Western countries and
Israel.
In India, one tends to think that Pakistan's use of terrorism against India
started in 1989 in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). It is not so. It started in
1956 in Nagaland. The ISI trained the followers of Phizo, the Naga hostile
leader, in training camps set up in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) of
East Pakistan. It also provided them with safe sanctuaries in the CHT from
which they could operate in the Indian territory through northern Myanmar.
In the 1960s, it started providing similar assistance and sanctuaries to
the Mizo National Front (MNF) headed by Laldenga in the CHT. The ISI's
set-up in East Pakistan also enabled the Naga and Mizo hostiles to
establish contact with the Chinese intelligence. This paved the way for the
training of the Naga and Mizo hostiles in training camps set up by the
Chinese intelligence in the Yunnan province of China.
It was partly to put an end to the activities of the ISI in India's
North-East from East Pakistan that Indira Gandhi decided to assist the
Bengali-speaking people of East Pakistan in their efforts to separate from
Pakistan and achieve an independent State to be called Bangladesh. This was
in the wake of the widespread disturbances in East Pakistan in the
beginning of 1971 following the refusal of the military regime of Pakistan
headed by Gen. Mohammad Yahya Khan to honour the results of the
December,1970, general elections in which the Awami League of Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman won a majority in the Pakistani National Assembly.
When the people of East Pakistan rose in revolt in March,1971, the R&AW was
two and a half years old. It was still in the process of finding its feet
as a full-fledged external intelligence agency, with a hardcore of
professional intelligence officers capable of operating under cover in
foreign territory as well as across the border in the neighbouring
countries.
The poor sense of communications security in the Pakistani Armed Forces was
evident from the careless use of telephones by senior officers, including
Gen.Yahya Khan, for conveying instructions to their officers in East
Pakistan.
The R&AW had inherited from the IB its intelligence collection and covert
action capabilities relating to Pakistan and China. These were not up to
the standards of the intelligence agencies of the Western countries and
Israel. They had many inadequacies, which had become evident during the
Chinese invasion of India in 1962, during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 and
during the counter-insurgency operations in the North-East.
The late Rameshwar Nath Kao, who headed the external intelligence division
of the IB, was appointed by Indira Gandhi as the head of the R&AW when it
was formed on September 21,1968. In the first few months after its
formation, he gave it two priority tasks— to strengthen its capability for
the collection of intelligence about Pakistan and China and for covert
action in East Pakistan.
A little over two years is too short a time to build up an effective covert
action capability, but the R&AW managed to do so. It went into action the
moment Indira Gandhi took the decision to help the people of East Pakistan
achieve their independence from Pakistan.
The 1971 war against Pakistan was not a war won by India alone. It was a
war jointly won by India and the people of East Pakistan. It would be wrong
to project that India was the architect of an independent Bangladesh.
India's role was more as a facilitator than as a creator.
Without the desire and the will of the people of East Pakistan to be
independent, there would have been no Bangladesh. Their sacrifices for
their cause were immense. How many of them were brutally killed by the
Pakistan Army! How many of the Bengali intellectuals were massacred by the
Pakistan Army and by terrorist organizations such as Al Badr and Al Shams
created by the ISI! It is their sacrifice, which laid the foundation for an
independent Bangladesh. What India did under the leadership of Indira
Gandhi was to make sure that their sacrifices were not in vain.
The Indian Armed Forces under the leadership of Field-Marshal (then
General) S.H.F.J. Manekshaw and the Border Security Force (BSF) headed by
the late K.F.Rustomji overtly and the R&AW and the IB covertly ensured
this. But, they would not have been able to succeed as well as they did
without the political leadership provided by Indira Gandhi and the
phenomenal work done by the civilian officials of West Bengal, Assam and
Tripura in organizing humanitarian relief for the millions of refugees who
crossed over into India from East Pakistan.
Indira Gandhi's dramatic decision to ban all Pakistani flights over India
to East Pakistan in retaliation for the hijacking of an Indian Airlines
flight by two members of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) to
Lahore in January,1971, paved the way for the ultimate victory in East
Pakistan. When the Pakistani aircraft tried to fly round India over the sea
by availing of re-fuelling facilities in Sri Lanka, Indira Gandhi
pressurized the Government of Sri Lanka to stop providing the re-fuelling
facilities. This greatly weakened the ability of the headquarters of the
Pakistani Armed Forces in West Pakistan to send reinforcements to East
Pakistan and to keep their garrisons in East Pakistan supplied.
The R&AW's role was five-fold: Provision of intelligence to the
policy-makers and the armed forces; to train the Bengali freedom fighters
in clandestine training camps; to network with Bengali public servants from
East Pakistan posted in West Pakistan and in Pakistan's diplomatic missions
abroad and persuade them to co-operate with the freedom-fighters and to
help in the freedom struggle by providing intelligence; to mount a special
operation in the CHT against the sanctuaries and training camps of the Naga
and Mizo hostiles;and to organize a psychological warfare (PSYWAR) campaign
against the Pakistani rulers by disseminating reports about the massacres
of the Bengalis in East Pakistan and the exodus of refugees.
Indira Gandhis dramatic decision to ban all Pakistani flights over India to
East Pakistan in retaliation for the hijacking of an Indian Airlines
flight, paved the way for the ultimate victory in East Pakistan.
The flow of intelligence to the policy-makers from the R&AW and the IB was
continuous and voluminous. This was facilitated by the co-operation of many
Bengali public servants of East Pakistan and by the poor communications
security of the Pakistani Armed Forces. One of the first acts of Kao after
the coming into being of the R&AW was to set up a Monitoring Division
headed by a distinguished retired officer of the Army Signal Corps to
collect technical intelligence (TECHINT) from Pakistan and China and a
Cryptography Division, headed by a cryptography expert from the IB. While
the performance of the Monitoring and Cryptography Divisions in respect of
China was unsatisfactory, they did excellent work in intercepting
electronic communications within West Pakistan as well as between West and
East Pakistan and in repeatedly breaking the codes used by the Pakistani
authorities for their communications.
The poor sense of communications security in the Pakistani Armed Forces was
evident from the careless use of telephones by senior officers, including
Gen.Yahya Khan, for conveying instructions to their officers in East
Pakistan—-without even taking basic precautions such as the use of
scrambling devices to make their conversations unintelligible to anyone
intercepting them. Almost every day, Indira Gandhi and others entrusted
with the conduct of the war had at their disposal extracts from the
telephonic conversations of Yahya Khan and others with their officers in
East Pakistan.
1971 in East Pakistan was a dream situation for professional intelligence
officers. Often, they did not have to go after intelligence. It came after
them. There was such a total alienation of the people of East Pakistan that
many were eager and willing to convey intelligence to their own leaders as
well as to the Indian intelligence agencies. Co-operation with the Indian
intelligence agencies was looked upon by them as their patriotic duty in
order to facilitate the liberation of their country.
Would our Baloch brothers learn a lesson?
*Role of RAW in Liberation of Bangladesh*
By B Raman
Covert action capability is an indispensable tool for any State having
external adversaries. Its purpose is not just collection of intelligence,
but the protection of national interests and the safeguarding of national
security through deniable actions of a political, economic, para-diplomatic
or para-military nature. A State resorts to covert action if it finds that
its national interests cannot be protected or its national security cannot
be safeguarded through conventional political, economic, diplomatic or
military means or if it concludes that such conventional means are not
feasible.
Any intelligence agency worth its salt will have a covert action capability
ready for use, when necessary. The Governments of some countries openly
admit the availability of such a capability in their intelligence agencies,
but not the details of their operations, which have to be secret and
deniable. Others don't admit even its existence.
In India too, the IB, under the foresighted leadership of the late
B.N.Mullik, its second Director, had a limited covert action capability for
possible use. The covert action division of the IB played a notable role in
the then East Pakistan to counter the activities of the ISI in India's
North-East.
The R&AW had inherited from the IB its intelligence collection and covert
action capabilities relating to Pakistan and China. These were not up to
the standards of the intelligence agencies of the Western countries and
Israel.
In India, one tends to think that Pakistan's use of terrorism against India
started in 1989 in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). It is not so. It started in
1956 in Nagaland. The ISI trained the followers of Phizo, the Naga hostile
leader, in training camps set up in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) of
East Pakistan. It also provided them with safe sanctuaries in the CHT from
which they could operate in the Indian territory through northern Myanmar.
In the 1960s, it started providing similar assistance and sanctuaries to
the Mizo National Front (MNF) headed by Laldenga in the CHT. The ISI's
set-up in East Pakistan also enabled the Naga and Mizo hostiles to
establish contact with the Chinese intelligence. This paved the way for the
training of the Naga and Mizo hostiles in training camps set up by the
Chinese intelligence in the Yunnan province of China.
It was partly to put an end to the activities of the ISI in India's
North-East from East Pakistan that Indira Gandhi decided to assist the
Bengali-speaking people of East Pakistan in their efforts to separate from
Pakistan and achieve an independent State to be called Bangladesh. This was
in the wake of the widespread disturbances in East Pakistan in the
beginning of 1971 following the refusal of the military regime of Pakistan
headed by Gen. Mohammad Yahya Khan to honour the results of the
December,1970, general elections in which the Awami League of Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman won a majority in the Pakistani National Assembly.
When the people of East Pakistan rose in revolt in March,1971, the R&AW was
two and a half years old. It was still in the process of finding its feet
as a full-fledged external intelligence agency, with a hardcore of
professional intelligence officers capable of operating under cover in
foreign territory as well as across the border in the neighbouring
countries.
The poor sense of communications security in the Pakistani Armed Forces was
evident from the careless use of telephones by senior officers, including
Gen.Yahya Khan, for conveying instructions to their officers in East
Pakistan.
The R&AW had inherited from the IB its intelligence collection and covert
action capabilities relating to Pakistan and China. These were not up to
the standards of the intelligence agencies of the Western countries and
Israel. They had many inadequacies, which had become evident during the
Chinese invasion of India in 1962, during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 and
during the counter-insurgency operations in the North-East.
The late Rameshwar Nath Kao, who headed the external intelligence division
of the IB, was appointed by Indira Gandhi as the head of the R&AW when it
was formed on September 21,1968. In the first few months after its
formation, he gave it two priority tasks— to strengthen its capability for
the collection of intelligence about Pakistan and China and for covert
action in East Pakistan.
A little over two years is too short a time to build up an effective covert
action capability, but the R&AW managed to do so. It went into action the
moment Indira Gandhi took the decision to help the people of East Pakistan
achieve their independence from Pakistan.
The 1971 war against Pakistan was not a war won by India alone. It was a
war jointly won by India and the people of East Pakistan. It would be wrong
to project that India was the architect of an independent Bangladesh.
India's role was more as a facilitator than as a creator.
Without the desire and the will of the people of East Pakistan to be
independent, there would have been no Bangladesh. Their sacrifices for
their cause were immense. How many of them were brutally killed by the
Pakistan Army! How many of the Bengali intellectuals were massacred by the
Pakistan Army and by terrorist organizations such as Al Badr and Al Shams
created by the ISI! It is their sacrifice, which laid the foundation for an
independent Bangladesh. What India did under the leadership of Indira
Gandhi was to make sure that their sacrifices were not in vain.
The Indian Armed Forces under the leadership of Field-Marshal (then
General) S.H.F.J. Manekshaw and the Border Security Force (BSF) headed by
the late K.F.Rustomji overtly and the R&AW and the IB covertly ensured
this. But, they would not have been able to succeed as well as they did
without the political leadership provided by Indira Gandhi and the
phenomenal work done by the civilian officials of West Bengal, Assam and
Tripura in organizing humanitarian relief for the millions of refugees who
crossed over into India from East Pakistan.
Indira Gandhi's dramatic decision to ban all Pakistani flights over India
to East Pakistan in retaliation for the hijacking of an Indian Airlines
flight by two members of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) to
Lahore in January,1971, paved the way for the ultimate victory in East
Pakistan. When the Pakistani aircraft tried to fly round India over the sea
by availing of re-fuelling facilities in Sri Lanka, Indira Gandhi
pressurized the Government of Sri Lanka to stop providing the re-fuelling
facilities. This greatly weakened the ability of the headquarters of the
Pakistani Armed Forces in West Pakistan to send reinforcements to East
Pakistan and to keep their garrisons in East Pakistan supplied.
The R&AW's role was five-fold: Provision of intelligence to the
policy-makers and the armed forces; to train the Bengali freedom fighters
in clandestine training camps; to network with Bengali public servants from
East Pakistan posted in West Pakistan and in Pakistan's diplomatic missions
abroad and persuade them to co-operate with the freedom-fighters and to
help in the freedom struggle by providing intelligence; to mount a special
operation in the CHT against the sanctuaries and training camps of the Naga
and Mizo hostiles;and to organize a psychological warfare (PSYWAR) campaign
against the Pakistani rulers by disseminating reports about the massacres
of the Bengalis in East Pakistan and the exodus of refugees.
Indira Gandhis dramatic decision to ban all Pakistani flights over India to
East Pakistan in retaliation for the hijacking of an Indian Airlines
flight, paved the way for the ultimate victory in East Pakistan.
The flow of intelligence to the policy-makers from the R&AW and the IB was
continuous and voluminous. This was facilitated by the co-operation of many
Bengali public servants of East Pakistan and by the poor communications
security of the Pakistani Armed Forces. One of the first acts of Kao after
the coming into being of the R&AW was to set up a Monitoring Division
headed by a distinguished retired officer of the Army Signal Corps to
collect technical intelligence (TECHINT) from Pakistan and China and a
Cryptography Division, headed by a cryptography expert from the IB. While
the performance of the Monitoring and Cryptography Divisions in respect of
China was unsatisfactory, they did excellent work in intercepting
electronic communications within West Pakistan as well as between West and
East Pakistan and in repeatedly breaking the codes used by the Pakistani
authorities for their communications.
The poor sense of communications security in the Pakistani Armed Forces was
evident from the careless use of telephones by senior officers, including
Gen.Yahya Khan, for conveying instructions to their officers in East
Pakistan—-without even taking basic precautions such as the use of
scrambling devices to make their conversations unintelligible to anyone
intercepting them. Almost every day, Indira Gandhi and others entrusted
with the conduct of the war had at their disposal extracts from the
telephonic conversations of Yahya Khan and others with their officers in
East Pakistan.
1971 in East Pakistan was a dream situation for professional intelligence
officers. Often, they did not have to go after intelligence. It came after
them. There was such a total alienation of the people of East Pakistan that
many were eager and willing to convey intelligence to their own leaders as
well as to the Indian intelligence agencies. Co-operation with the Indian
intelligence agencies was looked upon by them as their patriotic duty in
order to facilitate the liberation of their country.
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